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Abstract  
This paper proposes a definition of sporting creativity that is based on a phenomenological account of 
sporting experience. Taking philosophical cues from the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, it argues 
that creativity in sporting activity is the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in 
the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical 
and mental—or bodyminded—habits. This definition involves several key Peircean notions such as 
imagination, spontaneity, habit, and the continuity of body and mind, which are expounded one by one 
(section I). Some examples then illustrate the proposed definition (section II). This is followed by a 
more detailed discussion of the relationship between imagination, bodyminded skill, practice, 
experience, and the conception of possibilities in order to enrich the phenomenological description of 
creative sporting activity (section III). The paper then turns to consider some reasons why sporting 
creativity is of philosophical interest to sporting communities and, especially, for the integral 
education of the bodyminded person (section IV). These reasons are finally recast in terms of 
possibilities for creative self-realization in sport, highlighting the upshot of an education for creativity 
(section V). 
 Keywords:  Creativity, habit, imagination, Peirce, spontaneity, sport. 
Resumen  
Este papel propone una definición de la creatividad deportiva que se basa en una explicación 
fenomenológica de la experiencia deportiva. Tomando ideas filosóficas del pensamiento de Charles 
Sanders Peirce, se sostiene que la creatividad en la actividad deportiva reside en la capacidad de 
responder a los desafíos físicos propios de la práctica del deporte. A estos se responde de manera 
espontánea e imaginativa sobre la base de  hábitos físicos y mentales cuidadosamente cultivados. Esta 
definición implica varias nociones claves de Peirce tales como imaginación, espontaneidad, hábito, y 
la continuidad del cuerpo y de la mente (apartado I). Algunos ejemplos ilustran la definición propuesta 
(apartado 2). A continuación se expone una discusión más detallada de la relación entre la 
imaginación, la habilidad “bodyminded”, la práctica, la experiencia, y el concebir posibilidades para 
enriquecer la descripción fenomenológica de la actividad deportiva creativa (apartado 3). El trabajo 
retoma el análisis de las razones por las que la creatividad deportiva es de interés filosófico para las 
comunidades deportivas y, especialmente, para la educación integral de la persona 
“bodyminded” (apartado 4). Estas razones finalmente se modifican en términos de posibilidades de la 
autorrealización creativa en el deporte, destacando el resultado de una educación para la creatividad 
(apartado 5). 
Términos Clave: Creatividad, hábito, imaginación, Peirce, espontaneidad, deporte. 
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Although the practice of sport is often a creative activity, until recently there had been 
relatively little philosophical literature focusing specifically on defining or describing sporting 
creativity in detail. A notable exception had been William Sadler’s article entitled “Alienated 
Youth and Creative Sports’ Experience” (1977). In the essay, Sadler analyzed the creative 
practice of sport as a way of remedying the problems of youth alienation in contemporary society 
in the United States. Sadler defined alienation as the perceived discordance between the real and 
the ideal, between what is and what ought to be, in society and in one’s own life. When young 
people experience such a conflict of values, they may become isolated from society and from 
themselves. Youth sports—conceived as ludic, creative movement—may in such contexts serve 
as a way towards reintegration, towards restoring personal and social wholeness. Sadler therefore 
proceeded to describe the ways in which various forms of alienation may be resolved through 
creative sports experience.  His study, then, presented an important reason to pay philosophical 
attention to creativity in sports—through the creative practice of sport, the wholeness and 
integrity of human persons may be restored and strengthened.   1
His definition of creativity, however, remained vague. He writes that “in the creative 
experience there is…a fusion of bodily and mental activities in a new tertiary process from 
which [issue] creative products. Creative endeavor is characterized by an individual’s experience 
of integration that resolves a previous state of disjunction” (Sadler 1977, p. 88). Creativity is a 
synthesis of bodily and mental processes, but the nature of the synthesis is not described. The 
process of sporting creativity itself thus was not carefully analyzed. More recently, Teresa 
Lacerda and Stephen Mumford have written on the sporting genius, discussing creativity as one 
of its hallmarks (2010). Though they focus on the figure of the genius and the contributions of 
her strategic innovations to the aesthetics of sport, and not on what a creative process itself is in 
sport, they do provide interesting analyses of the relation of creativity to freedom and to 
intuition. Peter Hopsicker (2011) makes the detailed description of sporting creativity a more 
central issue for investigation. He proposes three benchmarks of creative behavior that mark the 
path towards sporting genius, namely, preparation, risk-taking, and dwelling. In describing these 
 This is in line with other works including, for instance, Anderson 2001, as we will see in the final section.1
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benchmarks, a more detailed description of creative activity in sport emerges, even if his 
discussion is framed in terms of how to train a genius in sport.    
In this paper I will engage the philosophical discussion on creativity in sporting activity by 
proposing a definition that is based on a phenomenological account of sporting experience. 
Taking philosophical cues from the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, I will argue that creativity 
in sporting activity is the ability to respond to the physical challenges encountered in the practice 
of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of carefully cultivated physical and 
mental—or bodyminded—habits. This definition involves several aspects to be clarified and 
refined, including Peircean notions such as imagination, spontaneity, habit, and the continuity of 
body and mind.  
In what follows, I will take up these issues one by one in reverse order (section 1), and then I 
will provide some examples to illustrate the proposed definition (section 2). I then discuss in 
more detail the relationship between imagination, bodyminded skill, practice, experience, and the 
conception of possibilities in order to enrich the phenomenological description of creative 
sporting activity (section 3). I turn to consider some reasons why sporting creativity is of 
philosophical interest for sporting communities and, especially, for the integral education of the 
bodyminded person (section 4). These reasons are finally recast in terms of possibilities for 
creative self-realization in sport, once again highlighting the upshot of an education for creativity 
(section 5) 
Prior to doing so, however, I would like to delineate the limits and scope of the present 
study. First, the forthcoming is an account of effective creativity under constraint. That is, the 
account implicitly relies on a conception of sport as a test of performance based on physical 
skills and governed by rules which specify the goal of the sporting activity and the permissible 
means of attaining that goal.  Any alleged kind of “creativity” that breaks the rules—thus 2
 In that regard, a definition of sport as “free, self-conscious, tested play” (Schmitz 1987, p. 35) would be acceptable 2
for the purposes of this paper, since it views sport as emphasizing good performance and rule-governed contest 
alongside free play. Note, moreover, that for my purposes tested physical skills are bodyminded; at no point 
throughout this paper do I intend to introduce a body/mind dualism by writing of “physical,” “embodied,” or 
“mental” skills or processes. Unfortunately, as John Dewey (1958) has pointed out, this dualism is so deeply 
engrained in our language that sometimes it is difficult to undo it without tortuous circumlocutions; however, I will 
try to avoid them, asking the reader to eliminate the dualism from his or her interpretation.
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255 
!54
Fair Play, vol.2 n.2, 2014                                     Daniel G. Campos: On Creativity in Sporting Activity 
ignoring relevant constraints—in order to attain the goal, or that is not potentially effective for 
attaining it, is not relevant to this account. Second, regarding the types of sports for which the 
proposed definition of creativity is suitable, I would like to adopt Bernard Suits’ distinction 
between sports for which athletes practice and those for which athletes rehearse. According to 
Suits, there is an important distinction between refereed sports for which individual athletes and 
teams can practice but cannot rehearse in advance of all the situations they will encounter in 
competition, on the one hand, and judged sports for which athletes or teams rehearse a pre-
specified routine (1988). I do not adopt Suits’ distinction so far as to claim that sport is divided 
into two different, separate kinds; I only deploy it as an useful distinction to restrict my 
definition of creativity as applying to refereed sports that require practice but where advance 
rehearsal is not possible. Alternatively, I might say that my definition applies mainly to sports 
requiring open, as opposed to closed, skills from the athlete. This is not to deny that rehearsed 
sports which test closed skills demand creativity; clearly the design and invention of diving or 
gymnastics routines, for instance, involve creativity. But my definition does not pertain to this 
kind of creativity and thus I admit upfront the limits of my definition. Third, the proposed 
definition applies mostly to the creativity of individual athletes as enacted in the course of actual 
competition, even if they practice a team sport. It may be thought of as creativity enacted by 
sportsplayers in the heat of the moment, and thus it may be called “in-the-moment creativity.”  I 3
will occasionally use the full label as a reminder of this emphasis in my account of creativity. I 
note also that in training for association football or basketball competition, for example, teams 
may create innovative styles and tactics of play, but again my definition does not speak to this 
type of creativity but to that of the individual player even in the context of team sports. Fourth, 
the forthcoming account of creativity is meant to apply to athletes at various different levels of 
skill and competition, not only to highly skilled sporting stars or “geniuses.”  So long as 4
 I thank Professor John Russell for this observation and the suggestion to call it “in-the-moment creativity.”3
 In this respect the focus of my paper differs significantly from Lacerda and Mumford (2010). I am more interested 4
in describing creative sporting processes phenomenologically and experientially than in characterizing the 
exceptionality of genius. Moreover, this and the next observation mark some differences with Terry Roberts’s 
discussion of sport and strong poetry (1994) and the possible links between testing boundaries, breaking conventions 
and creativity in sport. 
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sportspersons have cultivated a minimum level of skill necessary to practice their sport 
effectively, they may begin to play creatively with or against players of similar skill level, and 
my account is meant to apply to their incipient level of creativity as much as to the fruitful 
creativity of their sport’s greatest players. At the same time, the account ought to consider the 
relationship between skill level and creative potential. In other words, the proposed account must 
recognize that there may be grades of creativity as related to skill level and not be applicable 
only to the highest level of effective, creative performance. Fifth, it may be tempting to think that 
in order to argue for a definition of sporting creativity, one must argue that sport is art or is like 
art, so that sport is creative just as art is creative. However, I do not think this approach is 
necessary; furthermore, it unnecessarily invites the complex question of the relation of sport to 
art.  Instead, I wish to argue by examining sport directly and claiming that, in the case of 5
individual athletes who practice sports requiring open skills, creativity may be defined as I 
propose.   
1.Defining Sporting Creativity 
I have defined “in-the-moment creativity” in sporting activity as the ability to respond to the 
physical challenges encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on 
the basis of carefully cultivated physical and mental—or bodyminded—habits. In the first place, 
the proposed definition describes sporting creativity as mental and physical ability at once.  This 
involves the recognition of continuity between “mind” and “body”; the sportsperson is an 
embodied being, an organism that is able to think and respond spontaneously to challenges posed 
to him or her in the context of practicing a sport. In other words, the sportsperson is a 
“bodymind” that moves and thinks in a continuous act. In fact, as we will see, highly skilled 
athletes literally think and create with and through their bodies.  
Second, this ability to respond spontaneously to sporting challenges depends, for its success, 
on the careful cultivation of embodied habits. A habit is a general disposition to act in specific 
 This is a point of difference with Aspin (1983) and Wertz (1985) who approach creativity in sport by assimilating 5
sport to art. Note that Lacerda and Mumford (2010), though they are interested in the aesthetics of creative genius, 
focus on the aesthetics of sport qua sport, not sport qua art. 
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ways under specific circumstances. In the context of sport, a habit is a cultivated psycho-physical 
ability; it is an embodied potency that can be activated under specific circumstances to attain 
specific aims.  The human bodymind can become habituated, and the training of a sportsperson 6
consists largely in cultivating specific abilities to perform specific actions. For example, as part 
of their training, basketball players learn to dribble the ball with their hands, to pass the ball in 
different ways, and to shoot from a variety positions and angles in order to habituate themselves 
to perform these actions in many different circumstances during a game. In judo, the athlete 
habituates herself to move in a wide variety of specific ways while standing or wrestling on the 
tatami, always with the aim of unbalancing or immobilizing the opponent while keeping her own 
balance and mobility. In association football, the individual technique of a player consists in a set 
of psycho-physical habits, that is, of cultivated capacities to control, conduct, pass, or shoot the 
ball with all parts of the body except the hands, and especially with her feet, to dribble, to mark 
the opponent, to move defensively or offensively. These habits are coordinated and oriented 
towards a specific aim—to play football. The training of all sportspersons consists, at least in 
part, in a process of habituation in preparation for actual and specific competitive game 
situations. Effective creativity depends on habituating the body to perform specific kinds of 
skilled movement, as required by each specific sport. It is on the basis of cultivated skills that the 
sportsperson’s creativity is unleashed, so that through her body she can respond successfully and 
innovatively to the spontaneous situations presented to her in the course of the sporting 
challenge. As previously suggested, football or basketball players must train themselves to be 
able to dribble, pass, and shoot with correct technique. Once the bodymind is habituated, the 
player can dribble, pass, or shoot in spontaneous, often surprising, ways.   
However, even though creativity depends on carefully cultivated habits to be effective, 
habituation cannot substitute or eliminate spontaneity in creative sporting performance. Third, 
then, the proposed definition emphasizes that in-the-moment creativity is spontaneous. By 
“spontaneity” I mean, along Peircean lines, the irreducibly free element of any activity. In the 
context of play—which, I think, is wider than sports but also includes them—spontaneity is the 
 An extensive discussion of this notion of “habit” with regard to the human being can be found in Charles S. 6
Peirce’s 1892 article “Man’s Glassy Essence,” in Peirce 1992, p. 334 – 351.
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animating impulse.   According to Peirce, “Play…is a lively exercise of one’s powers. Pure play 7
has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It bloweth where it listeth” (Peirce 1998, p. 436). 
Spontaneity is the spirit, or metaphorical “breath,” that animates pure play. This is admittedly a 
metaphor, but it is one intended to help us identify a specific attitude with which we may 
approach an activity. In the peculiar space and time in which playing a game occurs, for instance, 
spontaneity is that freshness in our way of approaching the activity that keeps play alive. 
Spontaneity revitalizes play by renewing the courses that play may take, by changing its paths, 
and preventing it from becoming routine and ordinary. Spontaneity manifests itself as an 
exploration of the unexplored, as the giving play to the unforeseen possibilities of an activity. In 
the specific context of sports, I would say that spontaneity is the instinctive capacity of the sports 
player to act in ways that are free, unscripted, and not absolutely determined by a previous 
strategy or plan. It is a capacity to attempt new possibilities of action on the basis of cultivated 
skills, often by improvising in the face of unexpected or unrehearsed sporting challenges.  
Fourth, then, this capacity of the habituated bodymind to enact new possibilities 
instantaneously is inextricably linked to the sportsperson’s ability to imagine or envision new 
possibilities for resolving sporting challenges. The “imagination” here is a semiotic ability, that 
is, a capacity to create and recreate, to form and transform, signs. For our purposes, I adopt 
Peirce’s description of the imagination as “the power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate 
configurations” (Peirce, manuscript 252).  For Peirce, imagination and perception are indeed 8
continuous with and shade into each other. In a 1903 text, Peirce writes that in relation to 
knowledge and belief—that is, as a matter for logic—it is not valuable “to draw a hard and fast 
line of demarcation between perception and imagination,” even if as a matter of physiological 
 Strictly speaking, spontaneity is a manifestation of one of the three categories that are constitutive of any 7
phenomenon according to Charles Peirce’s philosophical system. An introduction to these categories can be found in 
his 1903 lecture “On Phenomenology” in Peirce 1998, p. 145 – 159. A discussion of these phenomenological 
categories applied to the practice of sport, especially association football, can be found in Campos 2006. Regarding 
spontaneity and play, see Charles S. Peirce’s 1908 article “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” in Peirce 
1998, p. 434 – 450.
 Peirce’s manuscripts are catalogued and numbered in Robin 1967.8
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psychology the distinction may be justified (Peirce 1932-58, 7.646).  This is because the 9
semiotic outcomes of both imagining and perceiving are signs—signs that flow in the course of 
continuous, ongoing, bodyminded reasoning processes.  As Sandra Rosenthal writes, for Peirce 10
“All knowledge begins with perception, but perception is not the having of brute givens. Rather, 
there is a creative element in perceptual awareness, an interpretive creativity brought by the 
perceiver” (p. 193).  I would venture to say that, in the sense utilized here, the perceptive 
imagination creates diagrams or sketches of given problematic theoretical or practical situations 
that require interpretation and solution, while the imagination proper recreates, modifies, or 
transforms those diagrams in ways that may possibly resolve the situation. And just as there is a 
mathematical and a scientific imagination, for example, there is a sporting imagination. In the 
context of a sporting challenge, the athlete forms a mental sketch or diagram—a sign—of the 
specific circumstances that she is confronting. This diagram is already an interpretation of her 
situation; that is, it is part of a semiotic process to try to understand the relevant general features 
of a concrete problematic situation. In response to the diagrammed situation, the imagination 
sketches schemas of possible alternative situations that would resolve the problem. This is an 
experimental semiotic process that transforms the situation into possible alternatives. The athlete 
then acts on the basis of one of these possibilities. She actually tries it out. When the imagined 
solutions are spontaneous, often surprising and ingenious, we may speak of the creative 
imagination. When they are actually attempted, we may speak of creative play.  
In-the-moment sporting creativity, in short, expresses the athlete’s imagination, where the 
imagination is a process of embodied semiosis. The creative player perceives and often 
anticipates challenging situations, interprets them, and is able to imagine possible solutions that 
 Peirce’s Collected Papers are referenced by volume and paragraph number. This reference, for instance, is to 9
Peirce 1932-58, volume 7, paragraph 646.
 Peirce’s analysis of perception is itself quite complex. I cannot do it justice here, but merely sketch some aspects 10
of it that will be helpful to understand its relation to the imagination. Very roughly, a percept (object) imposes its 
presence upon a perceptual awareness, and a perceptual judgment—a sign that purports to represent the percept—is 
formed as a result of the interaction between percept and perceiver. This perceptual judgment in the perceiver’s mind 
is itself an uncontrollable hypothesis so as to the contents of the percept, and must itself be logically scrutinized, in 
the course of experience, for us to learn whether it does accurately represent the percept. See a 1903 account of 
perception in Peirce 1932-58, 7.619-636.  A good article to start exploring interpretations of Peirce on perception is 
Rosenthal 2004.
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are immediately enacted. This involves the creation of “diagrammatic” or “schematic” scenarios 
that are quickly fleshed out and attempted. The player, for instance, envisions the possibilities for 
dribbling, passing or shooting in the very course of playing and dribbling, passing, or shooting. 
Now, it is important to emphasize that this does not mean that the mind “imagines” and the body 
“obeys;” rather, it means that the bodymind imagines, assesses, and performs in one coordinated 
act. The creative player at once imagines and enacts fresh possibilities that are not usually 
anticipated or expected by others. In sport, the imaginative interpretation of a problem and the 
experimental consideration of its possible solutions are part of a psycho-physical process. The 
concrete situation of sporting challenge is not analyzed by disembodied reason. It is rather a 
sensible and reasonable organism—a body that senses and thinks—that experiences it and tries to 
solve it. Imagining possible solutions does not involve only abstract considerations but concrete 
bodily considerations, that is, considerations of what the body feels and thinks to be possible. 
2. Examples 
Let us now try to flesh out, through examples, the proposed definition of in-the-moment 
creativity in sporting performance as the ability to respond to the physical challenges 
encountered in the practice of sport in spontaneous and imaginative ways on the basis of 
carefully cultivated physical and mental habits. 
Let us consider the case of ice hockey player Wayne Gretzky. In an article for The New 
Yorker, Malcolm Gladwell describes Gretzky’s capacity to pick up on subtle patterns that others 
generally miss. This is what we mean when we say that great athletes have a ‘feel’ for the game, 
or that they ‘see’ the court or the field or the ice in a special way. Wayne Gretzky, in a 1981 game 
against the St. Louis Blues, stood behind the St. Louis goal, laid the puck across the blade of his 
stick, and then bounced it off the back of the goalie in front of him and into the net. Gretzky's 
genius at that moment lay in seeing a scoring possibility where no one had seen one before. 
(Gladwell 1999). 
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The article then quotes Gretzky himself as saying, “People talk about skating, puck-
handling, and shooting…but the whole sport is angles and caroms, forgetting the straight 
direction the puck is going, calculating where it will be diverted, factoring in all the 
interruptions” (Gladwell 1999). Gretzky is describing, I suggest, a creative semiotic process in 
which he perceives a situation, forms a schematic image of it, and anticipates possible 
transformations of this schema that may be turned into actual play situations. The key to 
creativity is imagination, the envisioning of possibility, even though cultivated skill is necessary 
for actually effective creativity.  
Clearly, habituation of the bodymind through practice was necessary for Gretzky’s creativity 
to be effective. As the same article reports, Gretzky “would frequently stay behind after practice, 
long after everyone had left, flipping pucks to a specific spot in the crease, or aiming shot after 
shot at the crossbar or the goal post” (Gladwell 1999). What seemed most important to Gretzky’s 
creative style of play, however, was the ability to observe the whole rink in order to recognize 
sequences or patterns of play situations and therefore anticipate possibilities:  
Gretzky, who holds nearly every scoring record in professional hockey, baffled 
many observers because he seemed to reverse the normal laws of hockey. Most 
great offensive players prefer to keep the rest of the action on the ice behind 
them—to try to make the act of scoring be just about themselves and the goalie. 
Gretzky liked to keep the action in front of him. He would set up by the side of 
the rink, or behind the opposing team's net, so that the eleven other players on 
the ice were in full view, and then slide the perfect pass to the perfect spot. He 
made hockey look easy, even as he was playing in a way that made it more 
complicated. (Gladwell 1999)   
The second goal that Diego Armando Maradona scored for Argentina against England in the 
1986 FIFA World Cup may serve as another illustration of the account of sporting creativity here 
proposed. In particular, I would like to use it to highlight the relation between spontaneity, 
habituation, and enacted creative possibility. Maradona received the ball in his team’s own half 
of the field, with his back turned to the English side of the field. Through some skillful control of 
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the ball, he was able to turn quickly, dribble two opponents and head towards the English area. 
As he ran along the right side of the field with the ball close to his left foot, he had several play 
possibilities available. His teammate, Jorge Burruchaga, was running next to him, to his left, as 
an English defender came to mark Maradona. The easiest and most commonly anticipated play 
alternatives were either to dribble towards the right and continue running along the line or to pass 
to Burruchaga. Maradona chose, however, a short dribble to his left to continue advancing 
towards the area. The last English defender, as he came to mark him, now anticipated either 
another short dribble to the left, towards the area’s semicircle, the best alternative for a left-
footed shot, or a pass to Burruchaga or Jorge Valdano. Maradona, however, saw the defender’s 
movement and chose to dribble towards his right, away from the center. After this dribble, 
Maradona was confronting only the English goalkeeper, with two defenders still running 
alongside him. Maradona feinted that he would either shoot or dribble to his left, to procure a 
better angle of shot with his most skillful foot. The goalkeeper reacted by beginning to dive to 
his right, but upon perceiving this reaction Maradona again dribbled to his right, eluding the 
goalkeeper but also choosing a more difficult angle of shot. Maradona was nonetheless able to 
finish the play successfully and score with his left foot. In this play we can see the spontaneous 
actualization of embodied habit. The success of the play clearly depends on cultivated skill, but 
this skill is enacted spontaneously, freely, in ways that are fresh and unanticipated. We can also 
see Maradona perceiving and interpreting a series of problematic challenges and considering 
possible solutions. And we can see him actually enacting a series of creative possibilities. These 
enacted possibilities are in a way less probable, or at least, less plausible, options than the 
alternatives—to pass, to dribble searching for easier or more comfortable angles of play, or even 
to wait for more teammates. The play was successful because of Maradona’s capacity to put his 
mental and physical, or bodyminded, skills into play imaginatively and spontaneously.  11
These two examples pertain to two highly skilled players, among the best in the history of 
their respective sports. This does not mean, however, that my proposed account of creativity 
 Lacerda and Mumford observe that Maradona’s genius “consisted in his vision, anticipation of the game, and in 11
his ability to control the ball” (2011, p. 185). My account so far has aimed to organize this claim 
phenomenologically by describing the elements of imagination and habit, among others, in detail. 
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applies only to elite athletes, let alone geniuses. I agree with Douglas Anderson when he writes 
that “exemplary cases abound and are useful for making a case for creativity. But they are hardly 
exhaustive. As exemplars, they stand for a wide range of experiences. The creativity enabled by 
sport and movement is open to all of us, even if it occurs in ways that to the rest of the world 
may seem trivial. We must attend to the features of our own…creativity” (2001, p. 144). 
Anderson illustrates: “One might figure out how to move in such a way as to overcome an 
opponent one has not previously beaten. An ordinary jogger might find a new way to negotiate 
icy terrain. A right-handed player might successfully explore the possibilities of the left-
hand” (2001, p. 144). The Gretzky and Maradona examples, then, rather are meant to put in 
sharp relief the various elements of creativity that I have proposed. The high degree of creativity 
displayed by these players is precisely a difference in degree, not in kind.  Another approach to 
describing the various elements of creativity would be to observe carefully the accomplishments 
in particular plays, games, or seasons, of less extraordinary but still highly skilled players. Think, 
for instance, of Saeed Al Owarain’s goal for Saudi Arabia against Belgium in the 1994 FIFA 
World Cup that is often compared to Maradona’s against England. Though Al Owarain’s 
cultivated skills were not Maradona’s and perhaps the Belgian defense was not as good as 
England’s, one can see in the play the same elements of bodyminded habit, imagination, and 
spontaneity that I have described.  
Yet another approach is to observe carefully, with phenomenological gaze, one’s own 
experience performing, competing against, or witnessing creative plays in sport at various levels. 
Suppose there is a person who plays both association football and basketball. In football, he has 
developed from childhood all the fundamental bodyminded habits for controlling the ball, 
passing, marking, shooting, and so on, and has developed the tactical understanding of the game 
to play in the minor leagues of a professional team. This player probably can point to moments 
or games in which he was particularly creative in scoring, play-making, or solving difficult 
situations, and test whether the elements of bodyminded habit, spontaneity, and semiotic 
imagination work together to yield creative performance in the ways described here. But suppose 
this same player has only developed very basic skills for playing basketball—he passes well, 
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dribbles adequately, but shoots inconsistently and understands only very basic plays and tactical 
schemes. He can probably observe then, by contrast, the ways in which low-level bodyminded 
skill, stunted spontaneity, and lack of imagination lead to uncreative playing. It is precisely to 
this experiential approach that I appeal in the next section to develop further the details of the 
proposed phenomenological account of sporting creativity. 
3. Semiotic Imagination, Bodyminded Skill, and Creative Possibilities 
There is much more to investigate about the process of sporting creativity on the basis of 
what I have proposed so far. For instance, more needs to be said about the nature of what I have 
called creative possibilities. How are such possibilities conceived? What role do experience, 
practice, knowledge of the sport, and assessment of one’s own skill play in the conception of 
possibility? What is the relation between cultivated, bodyminded skill and imaginative potential? 
How do they constrain and foster each other? I will suggest some answers that I hope will 
provide at least a good beginning towards a fuller phenomenological account of creativity in 
sporting activity, even if they are tentative and will require further examination. Let me 
emphasize again that I aim to provide in this section a phenomenological description which is to 
be tested by reference to experience—both one’s experience in sporting and in witnessing sport. 
One may begin to address these questions by detailing more carefully the sporting 
challenges and constraints that call for creativity. The types of sports upon which I have focused 
here can be broadly described as rule-guided tests of bodyminded—ostensively physical—skills. 
The constraints on what the sportsperson may do, when confronted with such a test, are then 
given at least by the rules that delimit the activity, his or her skills, and, in the case of contests, 
other competitors’ own skills, strategies, and so on. All of these constraints present the 
sportsperson with a challenge that can be described as a problem to be solved. Perhaps for this 
reason, Hopsicker writes about solving “movement problems” and overcoming “movement 
challenges” by way of creative “movement solutions” and “movement pathways” (2011). 
Similarly, Lacerda and Mumford write: 
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Creativity is of particular importance to success in sport. As Suits defined it 
succinctly, sport is ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles’ [2005, p. 55]. Sometimes those obstacles are known in advance, 
sometimes they are unpredictable, and sometimes they are created by opponents. 
The genius can find new ways of overcoming these obstacles or can respond to 
their unpredictability through their creative acts. There is a problem-solving 
aspect in sport, which demands original and unexpected answers, improvised and 
innovative solutions. (2011, p. 189) 
Faced with such problems, then, how does the sportsperson conceive of creative solutions? 
My suggestion has been that this involves a semiotic process of perceiving and interpreting the 
challenging situation and imagining possible solutions that are instantaneously compared and 
then discarded or selected and attempted. Let me now explain, further, that the perception and 
interpretation of the challenge involves the elaboration of a complex sign of the situation. This 
sign is the result of an embodied process of cognition, and it is constituted by bodyminded 
sensations, feelings, reactions, and conceptions. The player sees, hears, touches, perhaps even 
smells and tastes, the challenging environment and its constitutive elements—e.g. playing 
surface, ball, wind, rain, teammates, opposing players, and so on. She feels both the qualities of 
the context—hostile, friendly, intense, relaxed, and so on—and her own bodyminded state—
strong, tired, concentrated, distracted, confident, frustrated. She reacts and is reacted upon by 
that environment—she resists and is resisted, pushes and is given in to, is pushed upon and gives 
in, slips and falls or stands firm, and so on. And she has a general conception of the challenge—
e.g. the general offensive and defensive schemes, dribbling and marking strategies, or wrestling 
styles that she is applying and that she is confronting. All of these elements are bound up 
together in her experience and are integrated in a sign that provides an interpretation of the 
complex situation she is confronting. I call this sign a diagram of the situation, but only when 
keeping in mind that this diagram involves not only intellectual conceptions but also bodily 
sensations, feelings, and reactions. The sign, then, is no mere mental image or representation; it 
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is a bodyminded integration of all the aforementioned elements of sensation, reaction, and 
intellection. Phenomenologically, this is what the sportsperson experiences. 
Given this interpretation of the sporting challenge, the sportsperson must conceive of and 
attempt a solution. I have suggested that she accomplishes this by imagining a way to reach an 
alternative situation that solves the problem and trying it out. Let me emphasize again that I am 
appealing to the semiotic imagination—that is, to the capacity to create and transform signs. But 
as I have just proposed, the signs involved in sporting activity are threefold as they involve 
sensations and feelings, reactions, and conceptions. The athlete at once senses, feels, exerts 
forces, reacts to them, and thinks about what is possible or not possible to do given the challenge. 
Therefore, imagining a solution involves sensory, energetic, and intellectual considerations. For 
instance, what a player may feel and think to be possible early in a game, when he is rested and 
full of energy, may be quite different from what he regards as possible late in a game that has 
gone into overtime. Similarly, what extraordinarily skillful players like Gretzky or Maradona 
may sense and conceive to be possible is not so to players of lesser bodyminded skill. Consider 
also Lacerda and Mumford’s example of Elena Shushunova’s “new combination of elements in 
the floor routine” to win the Olympic gold medal in 1988: “a straddle jump to land in front lying 
support, also with a half turn. The possibility of such a routine was of course open to anyone 
before but it needed Schuschunova’s vision and ability in order to become a reality” (2011, p. 
185). Alternatively stated, what are imaginative possibilities for a rested or more skilled player 
are, at best, imaginative impossibilities for a tired or less skilled player, and what interests us is 
effective creativity. Such effective creativity requires, in sum, the imaginative conception of 
alternative situations that solve a sporting challenge and of the pathways to realize them. 
Experientially, these alternative situations and courses of action are conceived through signs that 
transform in key ways the challenging situation—e.g. feign right to destabilize the defender and 
dribble left; bounce the puck off the wall and skate to receive it; signal a hard kick to the side and 
lob the ball softly over to goalkeeper to the middle of the net—and the player then essays the 
imagined solution. 
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One important consequence of this account is that the conception of creative possibilities is 
not the result of intuition in the sense of unmediated cognition. It is rather a semiotic response to 
ongoing embodied cognitions. Thus consider Lacerda and Mumford’s claim that creative genius 
“is intuitive. Rather than being a part of their conscious thought processes, the genius’s actions 
are more a matter of instinct and intuition” (2011, p. 188). From my Peircean perspective, this is 
fine since they mainly tie intuition to instinct and contrast it with conscious deliberation. The 
creative sporting experience is often one of unconscious, or at least unarticulated, bodyminded 
cognition. Such cognition involves sensations and feelings of the nature of instinct. The claim 
would be problematic, however, if intuition were understood as an unmediated cognition—that 
is, a cognition that is not the result of a continuous, though often unconscious, bodyminded 
process of interaction with an environment. 
The foregoing description of the creative process also suggests that the athlete’s assessment 
of his own bodyminded state and skill fulfill important roles in the imaginative conception of 
play possibilities. The sportsperson must be sensibly and reasonably attuned to what both her 
own cultivated capacities and her bodyminded feelings and thoughts allow her to do in a given 
context. A football player who is quick to dribble in reduced spaces and has a low center of 
gravity, feels fresh, and is reading the game lucidly, may imagine and attempt to solve a 
defensive challenge on a corner of the field by a quick succession of dribbles and a pass to a 
teammate she sees sneaking into the penalty area behind the defenders. If she is a slow sprinter 
and feels tired, though, she will not attempt to solve another challenge by outrunning her 
defender along a sideline, as she will not imagine it to be a viable solution. 
This account suggests, moreover, that bodyminded habit fosters and increases imaginative 
potential. The player must have cultivated the fundamental skills of the sport so as to embody 
them. This embodiment in turn liberates and encourages the sporting imagination since the latter 
is a capacity to conceive of possible courses of action that must not only be visualized but must 
be felt to be possible. The greater the mastery of skill, the stronger the imagination, as the player 
senses richer, more effective movements to be possible for him or her. This agrees with Lacerda 
and Mumford when they claim that one must have “certain capabilities—some physical and 
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some mental—in order to create, and one must be free to exercise those capabilities” (2011, p. 
187).  I would emphasize, again, that it is not only in the case of elite athletes that bodyminded 12
skill enriches the imagination. Learners at any level progress in their habituation sense and 
envision new possibilities of action. Both a young football player with a gifted left foot who 
improves his passing with the right foot and an old basketball hacker who makes efforts to 
improve his shooting grow in imaginative potential as they feel they are capable of new 
movement pathways.  
Likewise, practice, experience, and knowledge of the sport foster the creative imagination. 
Training practice is not only clearly linked to bodyminded habituation, but it provides a setting in 
which the developing sportsperson may try out creative possibilities more freely. In the context 
of practice, players may begin to take risks without fearing competitive error. Hopsicker argues, 
for instance, that well-prepared athletes must take risks to be creative and such risks may be 
taken in practice, where errors may be taken as opportunities “to turn mistakes into honed 
abilities” (2011, p. 119). As skill level increases—and the imagination grows—the fears and 
anxieties of taking risks in competition would diminish (2011, p. 119). Trial and error in practice 
also lead to a level of experience that is compounded by actual competition, and this experience 
also fosters creative potential. We may term this as experiential knowledge—the sensible and 
reasonable understanding of what has worked, is working, and might work and why. This 
understanding integrates the sportsperson’s detailed recalling of courses of action he has been 
able to follow or not, reflection upon why, and projection of what he may be able to modify in 
order to solve successfully future sporting challenges. The player learns from his trials and 
errors, his successes and attempts at perfecting them, and his failures and efforts at correcting 
them. He embodies this experience as a sense of what is possible and how.  
In sum, the imaginative conception of creative possibilities in sport involves not only an 
intellectual visualization of tentative movement solutions to sporting challenges but a felt and 
actually experienced sense of what may work and how and why it may do so. Cultivated 
 They in fact emphasize, in this quote, the element of spontaneity in effective creativity as well.12
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bodyminded skill, practice, and experiential knowledge are conditions that foster the creative 
sporting imagination and guide it towards effective and realizable solutions to sporting tests. 
4. Sporting Creativity, Enriched Communities, and Integral Education 
Let me turn now to a crucial question: Why should there be philosophical interest in 
defining, describing, and understanding sporting creativity? From a Peircean perspective I would 
like to emphasize two interrelated kinds of reasons, namely, the importance of creativity for 
enriching sporting communities and for enhancing the integral education of the individual 
members of those communities. I will note the first kind but focus on the second one, as my 
foregoing argumentation concerned individual creativity.  
The first point about communities is a general feature of Peirce’s systematic thought—
creative individuals can be agents for promoting the growth and enrichment of their 
communities, e.g. for communities of scientific inquiry to advance towards the knowledge of 
truth. In the case of sport, creative individuals and creative acts—in the sense of creativity as 
promoting effective problem-solving within the constraints and rules of the sport—enrich the 
practice of communities. When enlarged to apply to all individuals and acts with some measure 
of creativity, this point in fact contains Lacerda and Mumford’s thesis that sporting genius 
creates strategies that tend towards competitive success (2011, p. 184). They offer the example of 
Dick Fosbury, who originated the “flop” for the high jump and it became the best way to 
overcome the bar (2011, p. 181). Sporting creativity does lead to better—more effective, often 
simpler—ways to solve sporting challenges. This enriches the realm of sporting possibilities that 
the community conceives of and pursues. As Shushunova’s example from gymnastics suggested, 
possibilities are always there but creative individuals advance their communities by clearly 
imagining those possibilities and how to actualize them. 
I would add, moreover, that sporting creativity does not lead only to innovative strategies 
but to enriching experiences altogether. Even though most sport practitioners are not geniuses, a 
creative approach to playing in accordance with one’s skill level and within the constraints of the 
sport is often more joyful and satisfactory for individuals and communities than a rigid, 
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unimaginative approach. Players with a passion for sport enjoy, and later remember and cherish, 
those special occasions in which they have spontaneously and imaginatively overcome a sporting 
challenge at their level, whatever it might be. A fine, spontaneous, imaginative performance in 
youth football or a single fine pass to break a defense in pick-up basketball in one’s 
neighborhood may be cherished and relived for a long time. Similarly, most practitioners and 
fans appreciate the instances of creative action they have witnessed and received like a graceful 
gift. Though it has not been my focus, I may note here that this is also in line with Lacerda and 
Mumford’s thesis that creativity adds to the aesthetic value of sport (2011, p. 184). My point is 
simply cast in terms of the enriched quality of the experiences that sporting communities may 
aspire to and enjoy. 
For this reason, Hopsicker has pointed out that the issue of creativity is germane to the 
conception of what is good for sport. Creative strategies or techniques provide opportunities for 
emulation, point out clear possibilities for action, and set new standards for all levels of play 
(Hopsicker 2011, p. 115; Lacerda and Mumford 2010, p. 184). This involves a responsibility on 
the part of the genius or the highly creative sportsperson more generally—namely, creative 
innovations must improve the sporting practice (Hopsicker 2011, p. 119, 122). Again, creative 
improvement means providing better ways to solve sporting challenges. Building upon 
Hopsicker’s point, I would add that high level sporting creativity is not only germane to the 
conception of the good for the sport itself but of what is good for sporting communities. Such 
creativity enriches the ideals that the community strives to achieve and actualize. Creative 
strategies, techniques, performances, and plays embody what is good and admirable for the 
community to strive for and seek to realize.  
Regarding now the improvement and development of the individual within the community
—philosophical, and especially phenomenological, attention to the processes and experience of 
sporting creativity holds the promise of improving the integral education of the sportsperson. 
This includes the sporting education of the person, but I will suggest it goes beyond it. Regarding 
sport education and training, Hopsicker has argued that phenomenological attention to creative 
experience yields three experiential benchmarks that signal a developmental pathway to sporting 
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genius (2011, p. 122-123). These three experiential markers are like road signs that show the way 
and measure the progress towards genius. They are worth considering here with an eye towards 
promoting creativity in sporting activity even for that vast majority of athletes and players who 
do not aspire to genius but do aspire to excellence in their own measure of possibility. 
The first benchmark is preparation or “the embodying of raw, foundational material that 
allows the performer to experience more complex and innovative actions” (Hopsicker 2011, p. 
116). This is broadly compatible with what I have called bodyminded habituation. In an analogy 
between learning a sport and learning modern dance or jazz playing, Hopsicker goes into a 
helpful and lucid level of detail about the different kinds of skills the athlete must cultivate in the 
preparatory stage for creative genius—general skills or conditioning; practice-specific skills; 
engagement and integration with performance space, equipment, and own body; and learning of 
rules, histories, traditions and constraints of the sporting practice (2011, p. 116-117). I would like 
to highlight the last point regarding constraints, since I think this is one of the issues that make 
the question of creativity in sport interesting for education more generally. The embodied, 
physical aspect of sport makes it evident to students, practitioners, and observers that creativity is 
effective and even admirable when displayed within relevant constraints. Sport makes it possible 
for students and teachers to experience that one cannot be effectively creative until one has 
mastered the skills necessary for an activity within the limits that define the activity and make it 
meaningful. Hopsicker draws this point from relevant literature on the practices of jazz and 
modern dance and extends it to sport. I suggest that this is crucial for other areas as well. The 
case of sport may point out in very clear, tangible ways for other fields that an education for 
creativity does not imply an education without regard for relevant constraints in the arts, 
sciences, and humanities as well.  13
Be that as it may, the second experiential benchmark is risk-taking and responsibility. This is 
broadly compatible with my suggestion that in order to be creative, the sportsperson must be free 
and spontaneous in the ways she enacts and deploys her bodyminded habits. For Hopsicker, the 
 In a different context, for instance, I have argued that mathematical education must first engage the students’ 13
creative imagination, but this engagement is framed and delimited by the nature of mathematical problems and their 
objects of study (Campos 2010). As in sport, creativity in mathematics is meaningful and effective within proper 
constraints. 
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well-prepared athlete must eventually begin to take risks and be willing to make mistakes in 
order to solve difficult sporting challenges (2011, p. 117-118). He characterizes this transition as 
an “attitudinal shift” or “a shift from reliance on others to a reliance on the self” (2011, p. 118). 
By this shift, he writes, “the athlete must abandon format, prescriptions, and dedicated strategies 
and instead seek the creative, the novel and the innovative. Coaches must ‘disappear’ into the 
background to be retrieved as part of the athlete’s now personally instigated 
performances” (2011, p. 118). According to Hopsicker, this involves the assumption of 
responsibility on part of the creative player to accept, recognize, and recover from mistakes and 
to improve her sport through creative or innovative performances (2011, p. 118). I might add that 
this also involves a responsibility on part of the coach or teacher—those who engage in teaching 
for creativity must accept that their pupils might make mistakes and their innovative trials may 
fail. What both teachers and students, coaches and athletes, must keep in mind, though, is that 
creative attempts are for the sake of solving movement problems or sporting challenges 
effectively. Unnecessary or ineffective selfishness in the context of team play or innovations that 
complicate what can be solved in more simple ways, for example, do not constitute effective 
creativity.  
The third and final benchmark is dwelling within the sporting performance. It is the fruition 
and enactment of creative activity. In the terms I have used, it is the actual experience of 
integrating bodyminded habits, semiotic imagination, and a spontaneous approach to solve 
sporting challenges in fresh, free-flowing ways that surprise, delight, and are effective. 
Hopsicker describes “dwelling” precisely in terms of judicious perception and fertile imagination 
leading to effective movement: 
The performer [or athlete] sees more choices when solving movement problems 
and can utilize more innovative skills. She recognizes the varieties of potential 
pathways—the differences between “these places” and “those places”—the vast 
possibilities available to her to “go” and “do.” Dwelling in the activity requires 
the performer to regularly and efficiently connect actions happening in the past 
with those that will come in the future through an ever-changing intentionality yet 
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remaining focused on the goals of the project. Dwelling requires the performer to 
make split-second decisions, selecting one action or path in place of all others that 
beckon. (2011, p. 120) 
Notice the emphasis on bodyminded continuity. Habits or skills, knowledge, experience, 
perception, imagination, conception of possibilities, and bodily movement all flow together. The 
sportsperson seamlessly connects past actions to present and future ones, and all these actions are 
purposeful and teleological. This continuity—this seamless flow, linkage, and association of 
thoughts and actions—again suggests that what creative players do is not due to unmediated 
cognitions or intuitions ex nihilo, but to the capacity to feel, perceive, react to, and interpret 
sporting problems, imagine and conceive solutions, and enact them. The experience may be 
unconscious and perhaps ineffable, but it is one of bodyminded continuity and flow. 
Dwelling strikes me as an apt way to describe phenomenologically the experience to which 
creative sportspersons aspire. As Hopsicker concludes, the three benchmarks signal an 
experiential and developmental pathway towards highly creative behavior in sport, and future 
studies might delve into how teachers and coaches might foster students’ and athletes’ progress 
along that pathway (2011, 122-123). Since I have argued that creativity is not an experience 
limited to geniuses or highly skilled athletes, I propose that the developmental pathways pointed 
out by Hopsicker may be extended from the education of such athletes to sporting education in 
general. Sport education could be an area in which students learn to experience the continuity 
and integration of habituation, cultivation of skill, spontaneous play,  imagination, and effective 14
action for problem-solving. The experience of creativity is not the exclusive privilege of the elite 
level athlete; there are creative experiences to be lived and enjoyed at various levels of skill, 
play, and competition. 
I propose, furthermore, that fostering creativity in sporting activity may lead, for learners 
and strivers of all ages and levels, to the integral education of the bodyminded person. I have 
 Elsewhere I have argued that in the case of youth sport, play is not only the main reason for sporting but also a 14
condition for creativity (Campos 2008). In other words, the ludic attitude is not merely an added ingredient to youth 
sport, but it is its reason for being and is the animating impulse for creativity. Since I have not argued for the 
centrality of play in youth sport here, though, I will only state the view. For more on the role of the ludic attitude in 
youth sport see McLaughlin 2008. 
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already emphasized, for instance, that in sporting activity students may experience the 
relationship between respecting proper constraints and effective creativity. This strikes me as an 
important aspect of education in contemporary society, certainly in the United States where I 
teach, but in other places as well. Given the enormous environmental, social, economic, political, 
moral, scientific, and technological challenges that our contemporary societies confront, 
“creativity” often becomes a vague word for nebulously miraculous ways to overcome these 
challenges. There seems to be then a tendency to speak of creative education—or of education 
for creativity—as a solution to our problems. However, there is also a tendency to forget that 
creativity confronts limitations and constraints that must be acknowledged and understood, not 
ignored or disregarded. The experience of bodyminded creativity within constraint in sport then 
emerges as one in which teachers and students alike may learn about the relation between 
learning, training, cultivating abilities, understanding limitations, and imagination, freedom, and 
spontaneity for effectively overcoming challenges. 
Moreover, when I argue for the integral education of the bodyminded person, I am proposing 
to achieve what Sadler thought was an important purpose of creative sports’ experience (1977). 
As I observed at the outset, he saw in such experience the possibility of restoring the wholeness 
and integrity of persons, especially of alienated youth. Extending his proposal to all students, I 
am proposing that through education for sporting creativity we might foster the experiential 
integration of the person as well-balanced, purposeful bodymind. The educational systems with 
which I am familiar in the United States and Latin America do not help students to sense and to 
understand themselves as being both embodied and minded in a continuum. There is a decided 
privileging of mind, while the body is in fact treated as merely sustaining it. It is very common to 
see in those contexts, for example, that programs in art, music, and physical education, which 
emphasize ostensively embodied abilities and skills, are the first to be cut when there are 
budgetary problems. The result is a de facto Cartesian dualism in the lives of students, at least at 
school—to learn intellectual truths they must ignore the body or minimize its interruptions. From 
my perspective, I see this as an experiential problem. Students experience themselves to be 
seemingly disembodied beings. Then, even in programs that aim to educate for creativity, the 
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focus is intellectual creativity abstracted from the body. Their education does not tend to provide 
them with well-balanced psychophysical experiences, so that they can have a sense of 
themselves as bodyminded persons, let alone persons capable of bodyminded creativity. My first 
suggestion, then, is that a physical education for sporting creativity may help students develop a 
well-balanced sense of themselves as being an embodied and minded continuum. 
My second suggestion is that through such education students may experience themselves as 
being purposeful bodyminded persons. According to Peirce, a person is a coordination of ideas—
that is, of sensations, feelings, sentiments, energies, actions, reactions, perceptions, thoughts, 
inferences, habits, and so on. This coordination is purposeful or, more precisely, teleological, that 
is, guided by a telos, end, or aim. The person coordinates ideas in the pursuit of goals and ends. 
This teleological view has its roots in Aristotle, for whom human beings, like all other beings, 
have some proper function and telos in the order of nature. What is original in the Peircean 
perspective is that the personal teleology is developmental, that is, that the ends that a person 
pursues evolve and grow over time, and the person has some level of creative control over how 
these ends develop and how he or she will pursue them.  I have not argued for this conception of 15
the person here. I pose it, however, as a supposition in order to draw a consequence consistent 
with the rest of my argument. Through an education for creativity in sport, along the 
phenomenological pathways previously discussed, students may develop the sense that they are 
pursuing ends that evolve and grow and that they have a measure of creative control over how 
they will pursue them. The phenomenological benchmarks suggested by Hopsicker do not signal 
a linear progress towards a fixed end. It is not as if the sportsperson, once she is creative, dwells 
always in a fixed state. Rather, through renewed preparation and self-controlled risk-taking, 
greater challenges and higher-level tests may be tackled and new creative possibilities to solve 
them may be conceived and attempted. The ends, then, evolve and grow.  
Moreover, the conscious pursuit of a personal horizon for being effectively creative may 
imbue with purpose and meaning the stages of bodyminded habituation and preparation and of 
spontaneity, freedom, risk-taking, and assumption of responsibility. Hopsicker emphasizes that 
 Peirce provides a full exposition and arguments for this view in his 1892 article “The Law of Mind,” in Peirce 15
1992, p. 312- 333.
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an education for creativity in sport requires the virtues of patience and persistence, since 
preparation and deliberate practice are necessary for reaching the stage of dwelling (2011, p. 
123-124). Moreover, I suggest that the students, with the end of effective creativity in view, may 
develop a sense of the importance of self-control both in the sense of self-discipline and of self-
mastery. The students would develop self-discipline for controlling the urges, distractions, and 
frustrations that would deter them from cultivating bodyminded skills. They would develop self-
mastery in the sense of having skillful, well-honed control over their raw capacities and talent. 
Thus, virtues such as patience, persistence, self-discipline, and self-mastery would be imbued 
with meaning and purpose along the way to bodyminded creativity. These lessons, I suggest, are 
not relevant only in physical or sport education, but in the integral education of the bodyminded 
person. 
5. Upshot: Transactional Possibilities and Creative Self-Realization in Sport 
Overall, the most important outcome of an education for sporting creativity would be 
promotion of personal bodyminded integrity for those students, learners, movers, and players 
that are open to the possibilities afforded by sport. In this sense, the upshot of my preceding 
phenomenological arguments and descriptions falls in line with what Douglas Anderson (2001) 
calls the recovery of our humanity through movement, sport, and nature. He writes of three 
transactional possibilities afforded by sport and movement, namely, (1) the “felt” sense of sheer 
possibility, (2) the enactment of human creativity, and (3) the grasping of a larger sense of 
meaning, that is, the possibility of self-realization and self-transformation of the person as a 
locus of meaning.  The first transactional possibility, then, is the “had” or “felt” sense of 
possibility. This is, for example, the possible experience of feeling “lightness when stepping onto 
a basketball court in anticipation of a game—even a friendly game. The court seems to respond 
to the players' anticipation and becomes a site of freedom. They burst onto the court almost as if 
they were dancers…[T]he felt possibility wrenches us free from the domineering social world of 
the everyday....We know—because the game or the practice lets us feel it—that we have a 
capacity for more, even if we're not precisely sure what that ‘more’ is” (2001, p. 143).  
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The second transactional possibility is that of enacting human creativity. Anderson writes 
that the initial sense of possibility becomes “a condition for human creativity. The athletic world 
is full of exemplary cases in which a sport or practice is openly transformed by an athlete who 
takes up the sense of possibility and goes to work on realizing novel ways of participating or 
performing” (p. 144). What takes place here, then, is a transition from sheer possibility to its 
realization in concrete, particular ways. Anderson elaborates: “Even in the most ordinary cases, 
our creativity, our attention to realizing some of our possibilities, can fully awaken us to the fact 
that we are not only free to perceive or feel, but we are free to act. Creativity in movement 
reveals our human agency to us and helps shatter the sedating effects of the everyday world. We 
are made directly aware that we are more than passive ‘sensors’ of the unattainable” (p. 144). 
This is important because it emphasizes that these possibilities for creative action are available to 
any mover, player, or sportsperson who would be open to them and willing and able to try them 
out, to experiment with them; they are not available exclusively to elite athletes, as I have taken 
pains to argue.  
Anderson insists on the contemporary relevance and importance of pointing out the creative 
possibilities afforded us by sport and movement: “The claim that creative experiences in 
movement may awaken us to our humanity may, at first glance, seem trivial. This is surely 
something we should all know. But…we actually live as if we were blind to this dimension of 
our humanity, even to the fact that humanity involves such possibilities” (2001, p. 144). 
Examples include the amount of time we spend in front of TVs and movie screens—and now the 
internet—, teaching practices that presuppose passive students, and advertising practices that 
presuppose manipulable observers. In connection with this he concludes that sport “provides a 
sense of possibility, calls on us to face the world novelly, and gives us the room to create. 
Creativity in movement and sport reminds us that humanity is at once physical and mental, that 
we are part and parcel of nature; our physicality is directly involved in creating and is not an 
innocent bystander” (2001, p. 144). In my terms, the experience of creative action in movement 
and sport is important because it may reveal—if we are open to the possibilities—our 
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bodyminded humanity to us; it may restore a personal wholeness that we are in danger of losing 
in our de facto Cartesian society. 
The third transactional possibility is self-realization and self-transformation through creative 
action. It is thus conducive to fostering the wholeness and integrity of the sportsperson. 
Anderson explains it as follows: 
Human physicality, however, is neither inanimate nor without import. Just as 
creativity emerges from the initial sense of sheer possibility, so a larger sense of 
meaning may develop from our creative activity.... [Occasionally] creativity in 
sport leads outward to self-transformation. Movement and sport…may become 
the homes of epiphanic transitions that change our lives. These are the moments 
that allow us to see and experience ourselves in our humanity—we are awakened 
to the fact that we are embodied loci of meaning. In such instances, I think it is 
fair to say that sport and movement allow us to realize and to re-create ourselves. 
By this I don't mean that we come to some final consummation of being, but that 
we bring our full range of powers and energies to life-we become fully human. 
(2001, p. 144-145) 
If Anderson is right, as I think he is, then the stakes of an education for sporting creativity 
are high. It is part of an education for self-realization, for personal integrity, wholeness, and 
fulfillment. Bringing our “full range of energies” to life through creative action in sport is one 
way to actualize our highest capacities and achieve our highest ends as human beings. Therefore, 
this is one way in which sport educators have the potential for playing crucial roles in students’ 
lives by fostering their integral growth and self-realization. 
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